INTRODUCTION
The Narrative On April 23, 1930, an African-American named David Harris was lynched by a group of whites in Bolivar County, Mississippi. Hours before the lynching, Harris had killed a white tenant farmer, Clayton Funderberg, in an argument. Accounts of the actions that preceded Funderberg's death diverge. According to the lynching's chronicler, soci-4. How can this particular lynching be generalized without sacrificing its historical specificity and context? I will address these issues by discussing, in the first section of this article, what narrative is and how it uses temporal sequence to advance understanding. I argue that narrative is both essential to the sociological analysis of historical events and successful in providing certain kinds of explanations, but unsatisfying as an explicit and replicable causal frameWork. In the second section, I discuss how narrative may be merged with other forms of causal reasoning so that its strengths are analytically exploited and its weaknesses moderated. Here I lean especially hard on Weber's ([1905] 1949) formulation of "causal interpretation" and his brief for the use of historical counterfactuals and E. P. Thompson's (1978) insistence on "historical interrogation" as the basis of sound historical thinking. In the third section, I briefly identify several methods of formal analysis of narrative sequences, paying particular attention to the strategy known as "event-structure analysis" (Heise 1988 (Heise , 1989 ). The power of any methodology to clarify thinking and sharpen analytic logic is most profoundly observed when that methodology must grapple with pressing substantive questions. Therefore, I next put the entire framework to the test through a detailed and substantively grounded analysis of the lynching of David Harris. Finally, the article concludes with an assessment of event-structure analysis and a discussion of several of its implications.
NARRATIVE, TEMPORALITY, AND EVENTS
Lawrence Stone (1979, p. 3) offers a succinct definition of narrative: "[It is] the organization of material in a chronologically sequential order and the focusing of the content into a single coherent story, albeit with subplots." Narratives are analytic constructs (or "colligations") that unify a number of past or contemporaneous actions and happenings, which might otherwise have been viewed as discrete or disparate, into a coherent relational whole that gives meaning to and explains each of its elements and is, at the same time, constituted by them (McCullagh 1978; Abbott 1990; Griffin 1992) . Narratives are made up of the raw materials of sequences of social action but are, from beginning to end, defined and orchestrated by the narrator to include a particular series of actions in a particular temporal order for a particular purpose.
The intelligibility of narrative explanation. -Narrative explanations have a characteristic, "inherent" logic (Abbott 1992, p. 445) based on the sequential connectedness and unfolding of action. Narratives have a beginning, then a series of intervening actions, and then an end arrived at nonarbitrarily, as a result of preceding actions that emanated, ulti-mately, from the beginning of the story or from various contingencies logically integrated into the story. To locate an action in the sequence of a narrative and to link that action to the narrative's previous actions, for example, is one way to understand what "caused" the action and thus to "explain" its occurrence (Danto 1965; Dray 1985; Abell 1987) . Furthermore, when an action is linked to prior and subsequent actions in the narrative, one can comprehend its character and function in the entire temporal sequence; that is, how the action displays and furthers the unfolding of the event. Narrative, in sum, captures and reflects the methodological and historical significance of an action's temporal order: "Any historical moment is both a result of prior process and an index towards the direction of its future flow" (Thompson 1978, p. 47) .
When all such actions constituting the event are so linked, the event itself is "explained" or "understood" because the event-or more precisely the narrative construction of the event-is but a configuration of "elements in a single and concrete complex of relationships" (Mink 1970 , p. 551). Through the cumulative succession, connectedness, and holistic configuration of the event's actions, moreover, the narrative's coherence and unity are achieved and its central theme defined, refined, and exhibited. This allows the reader to follow the reasoning and story emplotted in the narrative (Gallie 1964 ) and, more generally, imbues narrative with a unique form of intelligibility (Mink 1970) . 3 Narrative and sociological explanation.-Arndrew Abbott (1991, 1992; Abbott and Hrycak 1990) persuasively argues that the processual nature of narrative is essential to much of sociological inquiry. In particular, narrative, in focusing on temporality and social action, promises deep theoretical knowledge about the mutually constitutive interplay of agency and social structure, a dynamic continuously occurring in time and through time (Giddens 1979; Abrams 1982; Sewell 1992 ). This reciprocal process, labeled "structuring" by Philip Abrams (1982) , is seen through the prism of unfolding historical events. Events, then, are our points of access to structuring (Abrams 1982, p. 191) , and narratives are how we describe, reconstitute, and comprehend events.
Sociological explanation of how and why an event unfolds as it does requires a type of causal logic that is grounded in "time" and in distinc-3 The merits of narrative are hotly debated among historians and philosophers of history, and the literature is vast and contradictory (see, in addition to those cited, e.g., Ricoeur 1979; Elton 1983; White 1984; McCullagh 1987). Three issues seem to be at stake. The first is the degree to which narrative is an acceptable form of explanation. The second pertains to the truth content of ostensibly factual historical narratives. The third has to do with narrative as a form of rhetoric (e.g., Reed 1989; Richardson 1990 ). These are important issues for sociologists as well (see, e.g., Abrams 1982, pp. 300-35), and I address some of them in the text and in the Appendix. tively temporal processes (Abrams 1982 , p. 302; Aminzade 1992). Most sociological explanations are comparative and generalizing, not temporal, in their logic (Lieberson 1985; Abell 1987) . They rely on logical comparisons of a few cases, analysis of statistical regularities of many cases, or logical subsumption of particular cases under broader historical generalizations and theoretically general laws (Abbott 1991; Griffin 1992 ). Narratives, on the other hand, are intrinsically temporal in both construction and explanatory logic.
Narrative explanations take the form of an unfolding, open-ended story fraught with conjunctures and contingency, where what happens, an action, in fact happens because of its order and position in the story. Narrative therefore permits a form of sequential causation that allows for twisting, varied, and heterogeneous time paths to a particular outcome. In narratives, we can see how the cumulative consequences of past actions increasingly constrain and limit future action. This notion of "path dependency" (Aminizade 1992) can be used to examine the determinants of key actions at any given historical moment, counterfactually explore actions and choices not taken, and help explain why sequential paths are sustained through time. We also see the "emergence of novelty" in narrative (Porter 1981 , p. 34), those contingent, unpredictable acts, often with big consequences (Gould 1989, p. 284) , that are nonetheless explicable in light of temporal ordering and connectedness. Thus through the way it organizes information and fosters understanding of sequentially unfolding action, narrative encourages, even coerces, far more explicit deployment of the sort of temporal causation envisioned by Abrams, Aminzade, and others.
The limits of narrative explanation. -Narrative accounts of historical events are not satisfactory sociological explanations of them. Narratives as stories often appear "merely" descriptive while really presenting, as noted above, an artful blend of explanation and interpretation. Even when narratives are avowedly causal in purpose (e.g., Fredrickson 1981), the criteria used to determine selection, causality, and significance remain tacit. Narratives too often lull readers into accepting the narrator's account as simply a "happening" (Abrams 1982, p. 307). Following, not verifying, the story is essential to successful narrative.
Despite the undoubted intelligibility of what the philosopher William Dray (1985, p. 185) calls "running" narrative explanations, they are, moreover, poor causal explanations of social process. By permitting temporal flow and sequence to carry the explanatory burden, narrative implicitly portrays all actions occurring before time t as direct or indirect causal antecedents of an action at time t. But, as has often been noted (Leff 1971 , p. xiii; Marini and Singer 1988), chronological order does not necessarily suggest historical or causal significance. Some early incidents are surely of no significant consequence in any given event, while others may have no causal impact on some subsequent actions and yet be required for the later occurrence of still other actions. Simply put, the distinction between a temporal antecedent and a causal one is too often obscured in narrative. Narrative sequence, therefore, is but the "primitive" raw material of explanation and interpretation and must "itself undergo radical transformation" in the course of analysis (Thompson 1978, p. 29) . Sociological explanation requires that events and their contexts be openly theorized, factual material abstracted and generalized, and the causal connections among narrative sequences established in a way that can be explicitly replicated and criticized.4 This requires information and insight not given solely by narrative.
HISTORICAL INTERROGATION AND CAUSAL INTERPRETATION
Narratives must be "unpacked" (Abrams 1982, p. 200 ) and analytically reconstituted to build a replicable causal interpretation of a historical event. Knowledge of an event's temporality, although too often inadequate for causal purposes, is invaluable because it allows the analyst to pose the basic historical question asked of any set of narrative sequences constituting an event: What is the causal influence of a temporal antecedent on what happened later in an event?
I suggest, as have others, that answers to this question are best adduced through a synthesis of different kinds of reasoning and knowledge. These range from the theoretically deductive and historically general to the historically contextual and particular, from the temporal to the culturally interpretative (Weber 1949; Thompson 1978, pp. 25-50; Porter 1981) . The most powerful synthesis of forms of knowledge comes through posing and responding to historically counterfactual questions and situations. I will discuss counterfactuals below and indicate how wrestling with them merges general and particular ways of thinking about historical events.
4 This assertion hinges on two premises. First, more systematic thinking about a problem typically yields better inferences. By "systematic" I do not mean quantification, statistical analysis, theoretical deduction, or many of the other characteristics often associated with the science side of social science. I mean those aspects of analysis listed in or implied by the sentence in the text. Second, most sociologists wish to understand how others explain the real world, however one defines "explanation," and are dissatisfied when theories are covert, crucial assumptions are not made explicit, and inferences are based predominantly on the idiosyncratic insight or intuition of individual scholars. This is not a plea for formalism as an end in itself; there may be very good reasons to avoid presenting the more formal dimension of sociological inquiry to readers. Objective possibility.-How can objective possibility be determined? Within wide limits, it is based on general theoretical and historical knowledge (Hawthorn 1991, p. 78). In the Deep South of the 1930s, for example, African-Americans generally could not organize and act collectively to stop a threatened lynching. They were denied sufficient social space and political opportunity for antiracist mobilization, and they were denied adequate resources to resist costly attacks against such mobilization, even if it were otherwise possible. Moreover, without the right to vote, they generally had no electoral clout with which to sanction politically those public officials who, overtly or otherwise, permitted lynching. These descriptions are historical generalizations suggesting some of the limits of objective political possibilities available to blacks in that region at that time.
Counterfactual possibilities, however, must be "concrete alternatives and specific to concrete situations" (Moore 1978, p. 377). To establish more precisely the possibility for and limits to action in a specific event, generalizations must be challenged by and augmented with information on the event's particularities. These, in turn, are apprehended through knowledge of the event's actors, its immediate context, and how both unforeseen contingencies and unfolding path dependencies facilitate and hinder the possibilities for future action. Once David Harris killed Funderberg, for example, certain future actions (such as Harris's acting routinely) were permanently precluded. Given what had happened previously to these particular actors in this particular historical setting, these actions were not objective possibilities. Finally, empathetic insight into particular actors' understandings and the "imaginative re-enactment" (Beer 1963 Fourth, the inferences reached through ESA, though often interpretative, are strictly replicable. Critics have precise knowledge of the causal imputations and the reasons for them and can directly challenge any aspect of the analysis, from the selection of actions to be analyzed to their imputed significance and causal connectedness.
How ETHNO works. -The analyst first prepares a chronology of actions which, in the analyst's mind, define the event. While ETHNO offers no direct assistance at this point, preliminary event-structure analysis often helps the analyst to detect weaknesses in the chronology and to refine it in various ways. The chronology is then entered as input into ETHNO, where it is then reformulated as a series of questions about the causal connections among actions constituting the chronology. The responses to ETHNO's questions are displayed as a "directed" or causal diagram of the logical structure of action underlying the event's narrative or chronol-ogy.6 The diagram, finally, is the event structure and represents the analyst's interpretation of the causal connections among sequences constituting the chronology.7
The causal logic reflected by the diagram is then tested for consistency with a set of logical constraints or rules about how action can proceed that is built into ETHNO. The most telling constraints (a) limit when an action is allowed to occur (i.e., it must be "primed" by the occurrence of a temporal prerequisite); (b) limit when an action can reoccur (i.e., its antecedents must be repeated, and its causal efficacy must be used up or "depleted" by a consequence); and (c) limit the causal efficacy of an action to a single consequence. These logical rules can be deliberately relaxed by the analyst.
If the analyst opts to circumvent the constraints (as I repeatedly did in the analyses that follow) rather than exercise some other solution to logical inconsistencies (e.g., reconfigure the diagram, and thereby alter one's understanding of logic of action), the theoretical constraints embedded in ETHNO are effectively mooted. One need not, therefore, accept the theories of production systems or rational action to structure narrative sequences with ESA. Indeed, event-structure analysis could be used to illustrate or test virtually any processual theory.
Event-structure analysis and ETHNO also allow explicit generalization of the initial (or "concrete") configuration. Here the analyst abstracts from the concrete event structure in two ways. First, actions which, in the expert's judgment, are embellishments on or otherwise incidental to the main paths of action or without imputed cultural or historical significance can be dropped from the "abstracted" chronology. Second, actions that are retained for further analysis are conceptualized as instances of theoretically general sequential actions. The computer program, ETHNO, then interrogates the expert about the causal relations between these 6 The software views the second word in each sequence as the verb connoting action and assigns it a three-letter abbreviation that appears in the diagram of the event structure. Should the same action verb appear more than once, ETHNO abbreviates the second appearance by using a number, beginning with "1" and moving to "2," etc., in lieu of the original second letter (see "Sho" for "shot" in action 5 and "Slo" for "shot" in action 22 in table 1). The abbreviations can be changed at any point during or after the analysis to those more to the analyst's liking. 7 The ETHNO program elicits only direct causal connection. If action A is judged to be a prerequisite of action B, and action B is judged to be a prerequisite of action C, ETHNO will not ask about (and thus will not automatically diagram) the relationship between A and C. The program knows, by logical implication, that A, through its causal influence on B, is required for C. The analyst, however, can directly relate A and C, so that C is portrayed as having two causal prerequisites, A and B. The program permits many other modifications of the event structure as well. generalized actions just as it did about the concrete actions. As the analyst answers these questions, ETHNO, again as before, constructs a diagram of action, this time structuring the theoretically abstracted actions at a higher level of generality and parallel to the concrete event structure. The general event structure is subsequently assessed for logical inconsistencies, both in relation to ETHNO'S internal logic and to the causal imputations embedded in concrete event structure. Logical contradictions between the general and the concrete event structures may necessitate altering either structure or both of them or relaxing ETHNO's rules about action.
What ETHNO does not do is answer its own elicitations. Causality is not "discovered" through its use. The analyst, not the software, possesses the knowledge needed to structure and interpret the event. What ETHNO does-and, at root, all that it really does-is relentlessly probe the analyst's construction and comprehension of the event. By forcing the user to be precise and meticulous about the construction of historical narratives, to reason causally about their sequences, and to be clear about the bases of causal judgments, ESA and ETHNO lay bare the investigator's understanding so lucidly-indeed starkly, as a diagram of the logic of action-that insights into causal significance are intensely sharpened, and problems of causal interpretation are prominently displayed.
THE LYNCHING OF DAVID HARRIS
The exact chronology of the lynching used in the concrete event-structure analysis is presented in table 1. (I use the African-American account initially.) This is the input for ETHNO. While I adhere very closely to Raper's (1933) original narrative, including the use of proper names, I refrain from using some of his linking words and phrases, such as "because" and "due to," in order to avoid prejudging assessments of causality. Two actions (15 and 19) actually occurred prior to their position in Raper's account, and their order in the chronology is changed to reflect this. I have added one action (6) to the chronology because it is an implicit action that is instrumentally necessary for the occurrence of later actions. The last incident in the chronology (23) Although this interpretation cannot be dismissed, it is woefully incomplete because it ignores the reality of black life and white law in Jim Crow Mississippi. That the law generally was not color-blind and was in fact "white law" in both its personnel and its "functioning" is incontrovertible (Zangrando 1980; McMillen 1989; Wright 1990 ). Law was seldom oriented or implemented to ensure in practice the U.S. constitutional rights of southern African-Americans as citizens of this country. The statistics on averted lynchings notwithstanding, the law all too infrequently even perfunctorily performed its duties in the strictly legalistic " The ETHNO program calls this type of causal relationship, where an action is induced by either one or another antecedent, "disjunctive" causation. Its query as to whether action A is "required" for the occurrence of action C suggests that eventstructure analysis elicits assessment of necessary cause (Heise 1989 Whatever the material incentive for the betrayal, and whether or not the particular black who told whites where Harris was hiding knew that the deputy and sheriff had washed their hands of the affair, all African-Americans knew the racist nature of the Jim Crow legal system. Racial betrayal required, daily and cumulatively, racist actions and nonactions, such as that dramatized by the deputy, by agents of the white legal establishment.'2 Unlike the more complex relationship between the white mob and white law, which really allows no firm historical generalization, that between African-Americans and southern "justice" was generalized in daily practice and institutionally anchored in the very fabric of social life. Racial betrayal, then, signified one of the cardinal social relationships, that between law and race, which both defined the South's white supremacist structure and was recreated every time the law failed to treat all of its citizens, black and white, equally.
There can be little doubt that the disclosure of Harris's hiding place facilitated his capture and subsequent lynching. Would this have happened in the absence of the betrayal? There were other racial betrayals that culminated in lynchings (Raper 1933 ), but such incidents appear rare 12 This is true whether or not the African-American was forced into his betrayal or was promised some private reward for his knowledge. The absence of an effective legal check on racist action is, in this context, the root condition of both racial coercion and racial paternalism. Finally, I also judged that either popular racism or legal indifference was causally sufficient inducement to racial betrayal (REV) and modified the diagram to allow the betrayal to be disjunctively caused by the occurrence of its three prerequisites (Rea, Ret, Not). My reasons for imputing a direct causal relationship between the racist reassurance of the white townspeople and the racial betrayal is essentially the same as that given for the connection between legal indifference/ racism and the betrayal. Two aspects of these generalizations deserve brief mention. First, two different sets of two concrete actions were each conceptualized as a single general action: the actions of the two enforcement officials (Ret, Not) constituted "white law support of racist organization/action" (Law), and the actions of taking Harris to the levee (Too) and tying him to a tree (Tie) constituted "racist ritual before lynching" (Rit).15 Second, what appears to be no more than instrumental action in the original narrative, the "telling" of Funderberg's killing by his friends (Rep), becomes in the abstracted sequence an action of central conceptual import, "white construction of racial conflict" (Con). My altered understanding of the general relevance of this act stems from its historical significance in the concrete event structure, a significance I did not suspect until after the initial analysis.
The general event structure was configured by answering 18 queries about the causal relations among these generalized sequences. In responding to these questions, I strictly followed the causal logic used in concrete analysis. That is, I structured the causal relationships among the generalized sequences according to how I had previously imputed causal connections among the concrete actions serving as "instances" of the generalized actions. The parallel concrete and general event structures are presented in figure 2.
The ETHNO program's assessment of the logical consistency between the two event structures revealed one serious contradiction. The generalized sequential structure in figure 2 indicates that "white popular support for racist organization/action" (Pop) is a causal prerequisite of "white law support . . ." (Law). This is a straightforward generalization of the concrete causal sequence beginning with "townspeople assured" (Rea), which is the indicator of "white popular support," and ending with "deputy returned" (Ret), one of the two indicators of "white law support." The implication of the general structure in figure 2 is that this sequence is general within the event; that is, holds for every concrete sequence. Yet this generalization violates the imputed causal independence between another concrete sequence, that between "Sheriff not responding" (Not), the other indicator of "white law support," and "townspeople assured" (Rea). The general and concrete structures logically and inferentially diverge. Varied solutions to this logical problem are quite complex, requiring close attention to the diagrams in figures 2 and 3. But the possible solutions, and the consequences of these solutions, are worth serious examination because they fortuitously demonstrate several methodological and procedural points: (1) how ETHNO views sequence and causality, (2) the importance of factual detail in constructing theoretical explanations (Stinchcombe 1978, p. 124), (3) how the tension between the general and particular can be exploited to inform each, and (4) how answers to historical questions are really hypotheses to be tested against the entire framework of evidence. Now to the solutions.
The ETHNO program gives the analyst the option of allowing the diagrams to contradict in the manner described above. But this "solution" assumes, as noted above, a generality that does not exist in the concrete structure. Another possible solution would be to assume "sheriff not responding" to have no general meaning, thereby dropping it as an indicator of the general "legal support of racist organization/action" action. Because it would not figure in the general analysis at all, the contradiction would naturally disappear. This, however, belies the causal importance I placed on that action in the unfolding of the concrete event. Or, because the problem at the concrete level is the absence of a causal tie between "townspeople assured" (Rea) and "sheriff not responding" (Not), I could also simply link the two concrete actions, assuming that "Rea" is a causal prerequisite of "Not." This, too, would induce logical consistency. But this solution assumes a connection between actions for which there is absolutely no evidence. It, too, is unsatisfactory.
One alternative that distorts reality less is to sever the general causal connection in figure 2 between the mob's "white popular support" (Pop) and "white legal support" (Lavv) and simply view them as different forms of mob facilitation rather than as cause and effect. What actually happened (the chronological) need not be generally translated as what must have happened (the logical; Abrams 1982). The absence of a required relation, moreover, is consistent with the internal causal heterogeneity of the concrete structure because, with two distinct concrete paths to legal indifference in figure 2 ("Rec --Rea --Sat --Ret," for the deputy; "Eng --Not," for the sheriff), no generality is found there. I opted for this solution (see fig. 3 ).
By relaxing the causal assumption between the two general sequences ("Pop" and "Law") in the abstract diagram, however, I produced two other, serially dependent logical problems requiring attention. Popular racism is the only prerequisite for legal support in the abstract diagram (see the "Pop -> Law" link in fig. 2) . If the causal connection between the two is relaxed, legal support (Law) has no causal prerequisite and cannot occur when it in fact happened. In ETHNO'S terminology, it is not "primed" to occur. I could ignore its order in the generalized chronology and assume the law generally exogenous to the actions that preceded it (as I did concretely for the sheriff in fig. 2 ). That option, however, violates the pretty clear influence that the "assurance" from whites exerts on the deputy's nonintervention in the concrete analysis ( fig. 2) and generally portrays the law as outside the framework of social relations and contingencies that, quite literally, elicits a response from legal agents. This is unacceptable given what we know generally of the links of southern law to the white community.
One way around both the problem of priming and the naive view of the structural independence of the law and the white community is to make racist organization (Org) the causal prerequisite of legal support (Law) in the general event structure. I did this, assuming, in effect, that all that was required to kick in (or prime) racist actions (or nonactions) on the part of Bolivar County's white police officers was the existence of the lynch mob (see fig. 3 ). But this causal imputation, though maintaining temporal fidelity with the original narrative, nonetheless introduced yet another inconsistency with causal claims about concrete actions made in the event structure in figure 2. No causal tie between mob formation (For) and the sheriff's lack of response to the situation (Not) was imputed in the concrete event structure there because available evidence indicates the sheriff was told only that Harris had killed Funderberg and not also told that a search party had been organized. This causal independence is a direct challenge to the altered generalization of the lynching shown in figure 3.
Is there plausible reason to reconsider that imputation? Perhaps. In the three decades preceding the lynching of David Harris, an AfricanAmerican was lynched, on the average, once every four years in Bolivar County (Raper 1933, p. 105 ). Even if one or more of these was not known to the sheriff, which seems unlikely, he at least knew the area's general racial norms and dynamics. So it is probable that the sheriff, knowing also that a black killed a white, would have suspected that a lynch mob probably would be organized. I therefore modified the concrete configuration by causally linking the formation of the mob (For) to the sheriff's nonaction (Not; see fig. 3 ). Logical consistency between the concrete and general structures was then achieved.
This analysis offers unusually rich insight into how the general and the particular are interwoven in causal interpretations of historical events (see Abrams 1982, p. 199) . Even as the general is constrained by concrete historical sequences, it challenges understandings of the causal relations among those sequences. In a manner similar to Thompson's (1978, p. 43) "disciplined dialogue" between theory and evidence, ESA requires almost constant movement from the concrete to the general and back again in order to solve logical contradictions between the two and grasp each more fully.
Unraveling the logical inconsistencies between concrete and general understandings proved more than an expository exercise. It also altered the moral dimension of the concrete event and of the sheriff's ostensibly "excusable" nonintervention. In my initial interpretation based on the logic of action diagrammed in figure 1, the sheriff failed to act on important information because he was legitimately engaged elsewhere. The criminal consequences of his nonengagement therefore rested solely with how the white lynch mob used his absence: the sheriff neither anticipated nor intended the lynching. In the current interpretation ( fig. 3) , however, the sheriff's inactivity is cast in a new light. Given his probable knowledge of the mob and its likely intent, his unwillingness to act morally, as well as causally, implicates him in the lynching and in the ensuing murder that logically followed his nonintervention.
Stripped of what I have judged to be nonessential detail, and with actor identities, actions, and causal connections conceptually generalized, the generalized event structure represents a skeletal view of the event, a bare anatomy of the lynching and its aftermath. It nevertheless remains contextually and narratively anchored: temporality is preserved, as are pertinent contingencies and particularities. Little of historical or theoretical significance appears lost. 6 While an analyst need not necessarily take 16 Earlier, I noted that there were contradictory black and white versions of the actions that preceded Funderberg's death. All of the analyses discussed above relied on the African-American version. To see whether my general inferences would be sustained by the white version of what happened, I used it to construct a new concrete event structure. I then assessed its logical consistency with the general event structure in fig. 3 . I found that the general event structure easily accommodates either the AfricanAmerican or the white account of the event's early sequences (analysis not presented). The abstract event structure in fig. 3 needs only the fact of racial intimidation, not its source or precise manifestation (i.e., Funderberg's threat to Harris in the black version; Funderberg's confrontation with Harris over stolen groceries in the white version). That this is so in this case and at this level of generality does not suggest event-structure analysis to this level of generality, it is here that the event's significance for comparative analysis, empirical generalization, and theoretical development is perhaps most visible.17 I turn now to several implications of the framework and analysis advanced above. 17 I performed a large number of such analyses by formally comparing, for seven lynchings, highly abstract event structures containing six general sequences. Eventstructure analysis indicated that the generalized event structures were logically identical across all events. This "processual robustness" (Goldstone 1988 Sewell [1992] ). It can be useful in deciphering how individual action, such as the racial betrayal, reproduces social structural understandings and constraints. One way objective possibility is determined, moreover, is through the very things implicitly or explicitly meant by "social structure": generalizations about social and institutional relations, resources, and constraints. Social structure is also used to help answer historical questions. My interpretation of the Bolivar County lynching contained many causal judgments, such as that about the relationship between the functioning of law and racial betrayal and solidarity, that were deeply structural in this sense.
EVENT-STRUCTURE ANALYSIS
Social structure, then, is best understood in analyses such as this as part of the "glue" cementing one action to another. But evocations of it are not substitutes for hard historical thinking. Social structure is not the cause of action (DiTomaso 1982), and it is not even the only cause of the conditions of action. Action, in my view, is "caused" by the conjuncture of reasons-emotive, symbolic, and utilitarian-for action and the consciousness of objective possibilities for action. Objective possibilities, in turn, are partly social structural in origin, but they are also partly the contingent consequences of past action and partly a question of an agent's understanding of the possibility of future action. An analysis of southern lynchings that ignored the South's social structure-its domination by the economics of cotton, its impoverishing sharecropping system, and its corrupt Jim Crow laws, for example-would surely be an exercise in futility. Nor would southern whites have lynched African-Americans so frequently or even done so at all had their history of military defeat and occupation, decapitalization by Emancipation, and subsequent resent-ment been different or had their culture of racism, patriarchy, male chivalry, and the "honor of Southern white womanhood" (Hall 1979 ; Whitfield 1988) been other than it was. But because some whites did not lynch, and even actively tried to stop lynchings, other white southerners, despite their structural situation and cultural conditioning, did not "have" to lynch, either. They acted purposively to lynch.
CONCLUSIONS
Historical sociology is currently in a state of methodological flux. Ideas about how to proceed vary tremendously and in somewhat opposite directions. They range from the advancement of strong research programs grounded in rational choice theory (Kousser 1990 ; Kiser and Hechter 1991) to a return to holistic historical interpretation (McMichael 1990) ; from the development of ever refined causal generalizations through innovative formal procedures (Heckathorn 1983; Ragin 1987 ) to the cultivation of a nonformal "evenemental sociology" (Sewell, in press) and even a highly formal "narrative positivism" (Abbott 1992). Event-structure analysis borrows something from each of these methodological strategies, though more from the latter two than from the others. Event-structure analysis, evenemental sociology, and narrative positivism, while diverging significantly, are all intrinsically historical in that temporal sequence and unfolding are central to how they approach and explain social process.
It is understandable, then, that some of the methodological concerns animating this article are often associated with narrative history, while others have been more heavily tied to analytically formal sociology. These questions are inextricably interdependent, suggesting, once again (e.g., Event-structure analysis may not be that methodology, and causal interpretation certainly need not be the only objective of narrative analysis. There are other formal narrative strategies that should be explored and fruitful ways to exploit the sociological potential of narrative that transcend the purposes and limits of event-structure analysis (e.g., Abell 1987; Abbott 1992). But through the questions ETHNO poses about the connections between actions, ESA, more than most methodological or heuristic tools, demands ever deeper probes into events and their historical and structural contexts, separation of causal significance from temporal sequence, the interweaving of the general and the particular, and confrontation with the silences imposed by the paucity of hard evidence. In so doing it forces substantive and methodological questions otherwise easily not noticed or avoided. Event-structure analysis is time consuming, highlights ignorance, and is humbling. It offers no ready answers to the questions it poses or to the difficulties induced by the tension between the general and particular. What it does do is make users extraordinarily self-conscious about what we know in general and in particular and about how to use that knowledge to structure historical events and to discern their meaning. Event-structure analysis thereby facilitates causal interpretations more grounded historically and temporally than is typical of most formal research and more nuanced and explicit than those usually contained in narrative. Nevertheless, the basic problem is real and cannot be wished away. "Real history" is neither known nor knowable. The historical recordwhat we know of real history-is subject to factual disputes and widely varying interpretations. As an often highly contested construction of the real past, it is unavoidably fraught with epistemological and practical problems. "Correspondence" between a narrative of an event and historical truth cannot be assumed. But all too frequently in historical research imperfect information is all that is available. The options are to use it cautiously or not at all. The historical record is the only body of knowledge both deliberately created to account for the real past and inadvertently displaying the tracks of that past (Isaac and Griffin 1989) . What is known of the real past through narrative or any other medium, despite obvious limitations, therefore must serve as the criterion against which both the plausibility of historical counterfactuals and the truth content of our explanations are assessed, even as our knowledge of the past is itself being extended, corrected, and deepened by the very research on which it sits in judgment.
